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Introduction 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 prohibits the Federal 
Government from substantially burdening an individual’s free exercise of religion unless 
the Government is able to demonstrate “that application of the burden to the person is in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that government interest.”1 This was the key argument maintained by the 
UDV,2 in the case of Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal,
brought before the United States Supreme Court in November, 2005.3 The pervasive use 
of illegal drugs within the United States has forced the government to strike a balance 
between the necessity of permitting religious freedom, and the importance of enforcing 
the Controlled Substance Act.4 One context in which the interests of the individual’s 
freedom has seemed to supercede the interests of the government is in certain cases of 
sacramental narcotics use.  Yet the justification for religious based drug use is not so cut-
and-dry as to permit enjoyment of this freedom by all established religions.  Some have 
argued that “religious gerrymandering” 5 has made acceptable partaking in particular 
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1 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1(b). 
2 O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal is the Portuguese translation for “The Spirit Center of 
the Beneficent Union of the Two Plants.” 
3 126 S.Ct 1211 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.). 
4 21 U.S.C. 801 (2006).  The act regulates the importation, manufacture, distribution and use of 
psychotropic substances, and divides these substances into five schedules based on their potential for abuse, 
accepted medical applicability, and general safety. 
5 Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York City, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).   
2activities for selected groups, while leaving others wondering why they are unable to 
obtain equivalent rights.6
In Uniao, the Supreme Court accepted the argument by the plaintiff, a 
representative for the religious organization, that the Government’s interference with the 
organization’s use of a Schedule I restricted substance, ayahuasca7, was a substantial 
burden on the exercise of his religion.  The Government conceded that their actions 
amounted to such a burden, however argued that the burden did not violate Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) because applying the Controlled Substance Act was 
the least restrictive means of advancing the government’s compelling interest: that of 
“protecting the UDV member’s health and safety, preventing diversion of [aya]h[u]asca 
from the church to recreational users, and complying with the 1971 United Nations 
Convention of Psychotropic Substances.”8 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that 
the Government failed to demonstrate that this burden would be justified under either the 
health and safety or risk of diversion grounds, and that the 1971 Convention did not apply 
to ayahuasca.   
This justification for religious drug use, however, has not always fallen 
consistently among differing faiths, and leads an observer to question the distinction 
between one religion’s permitted accommodations over another’s.  In Olsen v. Drug 
Enforcement Administration, 9 the Supreme Court rejected the Free Exercise and 
 
6 See Lesley R. Frank, Accommodating Religious Drug Use and Society’s War on Drugs 58 Geo.Wash. 
L.Rev. 1019, 1033-1040 (1990) (discussing the government’s selective drug policies in relation to religious 
organizations).    
7 21 U.S.C. 812(a)(1) (1988).  Schedule I refers to substances which (A) have a high potential for abuse; (B) 
have no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States; (C) have a lack of accepted safety 
for use of the substance under medical supervision. 
8 Uniao, 126 S.Ct at 1218. 
9 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ginsburg, J., joined by Silberman, J., with Buckley J., dissenting), cert. 
denied. 
3Establishment Clause claims brought by petitioner Carl Olsen, a member of the Ethiopian 
Zion Coptic Church, who sought an exemption on religious grounds from laws 
prohibiting the use and possession of marijuana.  Olsen was considered distinguished 
from the then unique exemption for Native American ceremonial use of the hallucinogen, 
peyote.10 However the facts and arguments in Olsen bear a stronger resemblance to those 
presented in Uniao than Uniao resembles the justification granted to the Native American 
Church.  This article seeks to address the discrepancies between religious freedom 
granted in Olsen and Uniao, while using the Native American Church exemption and 
RFRA as foundations to draw precedent from.  Part I presents the case history of Uniao,
as well as their beliefs and historical background.  Part II analyzes the differences 
between the drugs associated with each religious group, and compares the Court’s rulings 
to its justification of the Native American peyote exemption.  Part III suggests a test 
which could be implemented to aid the Court in determining the legitimacy of a religious 
organization’s sacramental drug request.  Part IV considers the disparity between an 
individual’s freedom to believe and freedom to act, as well as the differences relating to 
secular practice and religious belief.  Part V presents the issue of religious 
gerrymandering and xenophobia to non-traditional faiths.  Part VI addresses potential 
issues that arise associated with past judicial decisions. 
 
10 21 C.F.R. 1307.31 provides: “The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply 
to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American Church, and 
members of the Native American Church so using peyote are exempt from registration.” 
4I. Background 
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (UDV) is a Christian sect which 
was founded in Brazil in 1961 by Jose Gabriel da Costa, known to his followers as 
Mestre Gabriel, and which currently has over 7,000 members across forty cities.11 The 
UDV first appeared in the United States in 1988 in Norwood, Colorado.  Members of the 
pioneer group became associated with Jeffrey Bronfman, plaintiff to this case and 
representative for the UDV in 1989.  Over the years between 1989 and 1992, Bronfman 
traveled to and from Brazil to learn with the Instructive Body of the UDV.  He was taught 
Portuguese, and in 1994 became a full Mestre of the organization.12 Bronfman returned 
to the United States and established his church in Santa Fe, New Mexico, which in 2006 
had about one-hundred and thirty members.  At the time of this case, there also existed 
congregations in Seattle, Washington, Norwood, Colorado, Marin County, California, 
and Plantation, Florida, with a total of eighty-one additional members.  
 Central to the UDV faith is receiving communion through ayahuasca tea, made 
from the combination of two plants native to Brazil.13 On May 21, 1999, customs 
services seized 4 drums of ayahuasca plants.  According to the plaintiff’s declaration, 
twenty to thirty agents arrived at the church, accompanied by several state and local 
police officers, and responded as if the UDV was under a drug bust, searching for 
 
11 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, http://www.udv.org.br/english. 
12 Declaration of Plaintiff at 52, Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, et al., 126 
S.Ct 1211(2006) (No. 04-1084) (A “Mestre” is a religious leader of the UDV). 
13 The tea is prepared by combining two plants; the first is Psychotria virdis, and contains the drug in 
question, dimethyltryptamine, a hallucinogen found on Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act.  The 
second plant is called Banisteripsis Caapi. The name “Uniao do Vegetal” refers to the combination of 
these two plants, which are believed to have sprung from the graves of the religion’s revered historical 
figures.  These plants symbolize the spirits of these individuals, much like the wafer and wine represent the 
flesh and blood of Christ in communion by the Catholic Church. 
5materials to produce and distribute narcotics.14 Investigation revealed that there had been 
fourteen prior shipments of the plants to Santa Fe, however eleven of these previous 
shipments had been formally declared and cleared by customs and the FDA.15 The 
agents threatened the UDV with prosecution if they were later discovered to come into 
possession of more of the plants, but it was the UDV who brought suit, seeking an 
injunction and declaratory relief for the repossession of the plants.  The UDV alleged that 
applying the Controlled Substances Act to the UDV’s use of ayahuasca violated RFRA. 
 The Government focused on the argument of protecting the health and safety of 
the UDV members, and presented expert witnesses to testify that the drug had adverse 
and potentially permanent effects on its users.16 The UDV responded by presenting its 
own experts, who refuted the Government’s assertions for a lack of evidence and limited 
studies on the drug’s physiological effects.17 Chief Justice Roberts focused on the word 
“demonstrates” in RFRA, defining the word has having met “the burden of going forward 
with the evidence and of persuasion.”18 Roberts felt that unlike the government, the 
UDV was the one who effectively demonstrated that its sincere exercise of religion had 
been burdened.  The Court looked to Circuit Court’s precedent in applying a balancing 
test, stating that “the balance is between actual irreparable harm to [the] plaintiff and 
 
14 See supra note 12, at 68 
15 Id., at 69 
16 See Alicia B. Pomilio, Ayahoasca: an Experimental Psychosis that Mirrors the Transmethylation 
Hypothesis of Schizophrenia, Journal of Ethnopharmacology, Feb. 27, 1997, at 29 (study showing that 
users experienced symptoms similar to schizophrenia).  See also J. Riba, Subjective Effects and Tolerability 
of the South American Psychoactive Beverage Ayachuasca in Healthy Volunteers, Psychopharmacology, 
2001 at 154 (study using six healthy male volunteers to use the drug, one of which experiencing anxiety 
disorder).  See also James C. Callaway and Charles S. Grob, Platelet Serotonin Uptake Sites Increased in 
Drinkers of Ayahuasca, Journal of Psychoactive Drugs, 1998, at 367 
17 See Report of Alexander M. Walker, M.D., Ph.D. at 132, Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente 
Uniao do Vegetal, et al., 126 S.Ct 1211(2006) (No. 04-1084) (discussing a lack of adequate research by 
Callaway & Grob).  See also Report of Donald Robert Jasinski, M.D. at 141, Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita 
Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, et al., 126 S.Ct 1211 (2006) (No. 04-1084) (discussing lack of evidence 
that ayahuasca use leads to addiction). 
18 Uniao, 126 S.Ct at 1219. 
6potential harm to the government which does not even rise to the level of preponderance 
of the evidence.”19 
The Government next tried to argue that under the Controlled Substances Act, the 
requisites that the substance has a high potential for abuse, no currently accepted medical 
use and a lack of accepted safety under medical supervision, itself precludes any 
individual consideration or exceptions except those explicitly authorized by the Act.20 
The Court rejected this argument, fearing that accepting it would lead to a Controlled 
Substance Act that would admit no exceptions.  Rather, the Court states that RFRA 
requires the Government demonstrate that the compelling interest test be satisfied for the 
individual rather than burdening an entire class. 
 Lastly, the Government referred to Morton v. Mancari,21 arguing that there exists 
a “unique” relationship between the United States and the Tribes which permits the 
Native Americans to use peyote, however that relationship would not necessarily apply to 
any other religion.  Roberts flatly criticized the Government’s argument by pointing out 
that they never explained what the “unique” relationship was, and why such a 
relationship would justify the Government in permitting the use of a drug that, according 
to its own arguments, creates a risk of abuse and could prove dangerous to its users.22 
The Court continues by emphasizing that granting permission to the Native American 
Church to use peyote has not undercut the Government’s ability to enforce its bans for 
 
19 See O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d at 1009 (Seymour, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
20 Uniao, 126 S.Ct at 1220. 
21 417 U.S. 535. 
22 [If] any Schedule I substance is in fact always highly dangerous in any amount no matter how 
used, what about the unique relationship with the Tribes justifies allowing their use of peyote? 
Nothing about the unique political status of the Tribes makes their members immune from the 
health risks the Government asserts accompany any use of a Schedule I substance, nor insulates 
the Schedule I substance the Tribes use in religious exercise from the alleged risk of diversion. 
Uniao, 126 S.Ct 1222 (Roberts, C.J.).    
7secular use.  Lastly, the Court rejected the Government’s claim that the importation of the 
substance violated the 1971 Convention because the Government failed to submit 
evidence addressing the international consequences of granting such an exemption. 
 The Court concluded that the Government failed to demonstrate a compelling 
interest in barring the UDV from its sacramental use of ayahuasca. There were no 
dissenters of this opinion.   
 
II. Differentiation Among Schedule I Substances 
Throughout the Court’s opinion, there is no mention of Olsen, where the D.C. 
Circuit Court refused to grant an exemption for marijuana use by the Ethiopian Zion 
Coptic Church.23 Rather than distinguishing Uniao from Olsen, the Court focuses on 
drawing similarities between the Native American Church and the Uniao do Vegetal, 
from both a policy standpoint, as well as the effects of the two drugs.  The question arises 
as to whether the Court actively attempted to avoid the subject of Olsen, and if argued 
today, if Olsen still would have been decided the way it had. 
 The three drugs in question, dimethyltryptamine (the hallucinogenic chemical in 
ayahuasca), mescaline (found in peyote) and marijuana, all fall into the same class of 
Schedule I substances,24 but have been treated differently by the courts over the years.  
Marijuana has itself been the subject of scrutiny for a number of religion oriented cases, 
although unlike other drugs, has continually been rejected exceptions for religious 
purposes.  This is likely due to the fact that marijuana use has proven to be much more 
 
23 The majority opinion rejecting sacramental drug use in Olsen was written by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, now 
a member of the Supreme Court who joined the decision by Roberts in Uniao to permit similar sacramental 
drug use. 
24 See supra note 7. 
8pervasive in the United States than any other illegal substance.  According to a 2005 
study by the Drug Enforcement Administration, 44.8% of 12th-graders had used 
marijuana in their lifetimes, as opposed to a much smaller percent of peyote and DMT 
users.25 In McBride v. Shawnee County,26 the court noted that almost 800,000 times as 
many pounds of marijuana had been confiscated by the DEA than peyote between 1980 
and 1987.27 If these statistics hold true for today, that may create a potential justification 
by the Government in promoting the interest of preventing diversion of non-adherents to 
the religion in question.  Yet these statistics only refer to the general pervasiveness of the 
drug, and speaks nothing about the justification under the other prong of the compelling 
interest test. 
 In addition, the Court in McBride justified itself by referring to the special rights 
granted to Native Americans which were specifically rejected in Uniao. The Court 
pressed the differences even more by stating that under Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,28 
Native Americans have special benefits because they are considered domestic dependant 
nations.  A question arises as to whether it is thus justified for the government to place 
favor on one particular cultural group over another, and thus grant them further rights 
based on the fact that they were abused by the government generations ago.  By granting 
the Native American Church specific enumerated rights as a kind of “affirmative action,” 
using law a law that was written over 150 years ago to remedy a situation long since 
passed, the government effectively shuts out other potentially shunned and ostracized 
cultures from being granted their own social rights solely on the justification that the U.S. 
 
25 Marijuana Use/User Population, http://www.drugabuse.gov/infofacts/marijuana.html (discussing trends 
of marijuana use by grade school students over a twelve year period). 
26 71 F.Supp.2d 1098 (1999). 
27 Id. at 1111. 
28 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
9government does not owe them restitution.  Yet if the Rastafarian Church in McBride is 
to be treated equally as other religions, while the Native Americans are considered the 
exception, that would further the court’s attempts to prohibit drug use for religious 
purposes by separating the two groups of religions, those aboriginal to North America, 
and everyone else.  This may get around RFRA by construing rules related to drug use by 
the Native American Church as a unique exception, but would be inconsistent with the 
decision by the Roberts Court in Uniao.
Under The Protection and Preservation of Traditional Religions of Native 
Americans Act,29 the government permits Native Americans the use of peyote, mitigating 
the acquiescence by stating that peyote has existed for centuries, and that its use has been 
permitted since 1965.  Although a court would not be able to argue that because it has 
been used since 1965 it has a history and tradition of use, it may be justified in arguing 
the legitimacy of the Native American peyote use as a traditional cultural act indigenous 
to the United States.  The government may then be justified in permitting the use of 
ayahuasca by members of the UDV by noting that the UDV is a religion native to the 
Americas, and thus similarly situated under the statute.  However, the government would 
then essentially be favoring religions of those who originated in the Americas as opposed 
to those who had moved here from another continent.  In addition, the United States has 
traditionally granted unique benefits to Native Americans which have not been permitted 
for other cultures30 
The definition “Indian Religion” may be one way in which the government can 
justify a similarity between the UDV and the Native American Church while drawing it 
 
29 42 U.S.C. 1996. 
30 See Indian Employment Credit Act, 26 U.S.C. 45A. 
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further from the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church.  Under the statute, the term “Indian 
Religion” means any religion “which is practiced by Indians, and the origin and 
interpretations of which is a form within a traditional Indian culture or community.31 
There is no statutory definition of what is an “Indian,” which could lead an objective 
observer to conclusively assume that all Native Americans are also Indians.  The “origin 
and interpretation” of the UDV faith comes from a pre-Columbian belief indigenous to 
the Americas.  Like many other religions whose practices have been assimilated under a 
Christian umbrella,32 the UDV has still originated from a traditional Indian culture or 
community. 
 The flaw in this argument is that it would permit converts of the religion to be 
granted the same rights as those with blood lines to the culture.  Where the Native 
American Church is made up entirely of those born into the faith, the majority of 
members of the North American UDV Churches are converts. 33  By permitting 
sacramental use of ayahuasca to non-native converts to the faith, the government may be 
opening the potential for non-Native Americans to acquire and use peyote by asserting 
that they are indeed members of the faith, and being that a religion is an individual’s 
subjective lifestyle, it would be difficult for an outsider to disprove.  Yet the statute 
explicitly states that only those who are recognized as Indians will the statute apply to, 
thus potentially raising an equal protection concern.34 
31 42 U.S.C. 1996a(c)(3).  
32 See Richard Fletcher, The Barbarian Conversions: From Paganism to Christianity (1998). 
33 See supra note 10. 
34 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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III. The Adherents of Faith Test 
There are certainly many cultural differences between the religions in question, as 
well as the practices they adhere to while consuming their respective intoxicants.  Aside 
from the actual effect of the drug used, the combination and ritual of the plants psychotria 
viridis and banisteripsis caapi,35 bear a strong resemblance that of taking communion for 
the Catholic Church.  Where one drug is the actual intoxicant, the other serves as another 
important component of enacting the ritual.  The legality of the substance has no bearing 
on the ritualistic and spiritual factors involved in receiving a religious communion.  
Consider the Constitutional prohibition of alcohol in the early part of the 20th century;36 
enacting laws which make alcohol illegal does not alter the necessary and sacred purpose 
of obeying the word of one’s god37. Forcing an individual to forsake his or her own 
beliefs due to the requirements of the government would effectively violate the perceived 
notion of a separation of Church and State.  If the Church must adhere to the commands 
of the State, then the Church is no longer a house of faith but an inhibited institution 
pinned under the regime of an omnipotent secular authority.  This can not be the case, as 
the State would never conversely permit the Church to undermine the actions and 
decisions of a government.  Where a government is the exertion of influence in a State, 
religion is the exertion of influence in a Church.  A Church must be free to decide upon 
the rules and declarations of a religious faith, just as a State must be free to determine 
what is necessary for the advancement of a government. 
 Under this analysis, no religion should be forced to adhere to the laws of the State, 
and a State should not be forced to adhere to religious doctrine.  Perhaps a State should 
 
35 See supra note 12. 
36 U.S. Const. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. Const. amend. XXI. 
37 Both Judaism and Catholicism require the consumption of sacramental wine. 
12
permit the smaller, less powerful religion to co-exist as an independent authority yet still 
subsumed by political governance, much like tribal land within the United States, or 
consulates within foreign nations.  Unfortunately, doing so would also present problems 
in both the enforcement of laws intended to protect the citizenry, as well as establishing 
the legitimacy of a religion.  In order to allow a Church to exist without the pressures of a 
State, but still enjoy the comfort and security it provides, the State would have to be 
willing to accept a modified policing regime, enforcing laws which protect the individual 
from outside harms but still permitting that individual to make independent decisions for 
his or her self.  Thus one would not be allowed to commit a crime against another, but the 
compelling interest related to protecting the health and safety of the individual would be 
null, and thus leave actions such as consumption of intoxicating substances up to the 
discretion of that individual.  Hence the individual would be given a choice as to whether 
to partake in the use of a sacramental drug without fear of repercussion by the State.  The 
State could still promote anti-drug endeavors in the public setting, as well as restrict 
Churches from advertising their use of sacramental intoxicants, much like restrictions 
upon federal funding for advertisement of abortion clinics.38 
A question may arise as to how this would affect the children of members of such 
organizations.  Traditionally, the Government does not recognize the interests of the 
individual child as being separate from the interests of the parent39 This system may 
itself be flawed in that it may neglect adequate protection for the welfare of the youth, 
however the Government’s own argument has consistently maintained that a parent 
 
38 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
39 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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should be permitted to raise his or her child in whatever manner the individual sees fit.40 
The Uniao do Vegetal places a strong emphasis on the importance of family unity,41 as do 
adherents of many other religions believe it necessary to instill the tenets of the family’s 
faith in the child at a young age.  Consider Confirmation by the Catholic Church, or a Bar 
Mitzvah in Jewish families.  In accordance with cultural and religious beliefs, the child 
becomes an adult at the age of thirteen, far younger than the age in which modern 
American society passes such title.  Thus, regardless of the legal standing of the 
adolescent by the Government, sincere devotees to various religious structures have 
considered their children to be adults at differing ages.  Hence, a child should be 
permitted the same freedom as an adult to participate in the activities of a smaller 
independent religious society if such a right is consistent with the religion’s canon, even 
if not necessarily in concurrence the secular standard. 
 A second problem may exist in determining the legitimacy of a given religion, 
which religions are able to obtain exclusive church rights, and how large, individually 
and overall, a Church may be.  By enabling a Church to grow too large, the State would 
be forfeiting its own power to the Church, and increasing the risk of adherents to these 
faiths forsaking their loyalties to the State in favor of their religion.  If the State were to 
attempt to limit the size and authority of the Church, the State would effectively be 
violating the Establishment Clause.  A State would then need to have a system to 
determine the legitimacy of a Church.  This could be achieved through considering (A) 
the history and tradition of the Church, (B) the degree of commonality of faith and 
 
40 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (O’Connor, J.). 
41 Declaration of Plaintiff at 62, Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, et al., 126 
S.Ct 1211(2006) (No. 04-1084) 
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practice by its adherents, and (C) the burden in which permitting its practices would 
usurp the authority of the State. 
 Under the first prong, the court would question the history and tradition of a 
given Church.  The UDV was founded in 1961,42 however adherents to faith may also 
argue that their cultural practice in consumption of ayahuasca has been occurring since 
pre-Columbian times, long before the establishment of the United States and its laws.43 
The same argument could follow from the Native American Church, as the government 
has asserted that traditional Indian practices must be kept intact.44 The Ethiopian Zion 
Coptic Church was developed in 1914 by Marcus Garvey and later became the 
inspiration for the practice of Rastafarianism. 45  According to the Rastafarians, the 
Jamaican Negroes originated in Ethiopia, their symbolic leader being the Emperor Haile 
Selassie I.46 The question would arise as to how long a religion must exist before it is 
considered as having had a history.  Currently there are between 3,000 to 5,000 
Rastafarians in the United States, and almost one million adherents worldwide.47 Based 
on these numbers the burden would be on the State to prove that such a faith lacks a 
 
42 Declaration of Plaintiff at 50, Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, et al., 126 
S.Ct 1211(2006) (No. 04-1084). 
43 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, http://www.udv.org.br/english 
44 There may be reason to believe that the United States preserves the Native American way of life and 
grants them additional unique freedoms in order to sustain as sort of a living museum of the prehistoric 
existence of Tribes in the Americas.  Consider that in the United States, if an archaeological study is 
conducted in which human bones are excavated from the site, the Tribes are given the opportunity to 
inspect the site and even close it down if they believe the site belonged to their ancestors.  After which they 
are permitted to appropriate the site.  This creates much frustration for the American archaeological 
community.  See T.J. Ferguson, Native Americans and the Practice of Archaeology, 25 Annual Review of 
Anthropology 63, 63-79 (1996).  See also Sarah Richardson, Skull Wars: Kennewick Man, Archaeology, 
and the Battle for Native American Identity (2000). 
45 Clifton L. Holland, Towards a Classification System of Religious Groups in the Americans by Major 
Traditions and Family Types 126 (2004). 
46 Id. at 110. 
47 J. Gordon Melton, Encyclopedia of American Religions 1754 (5th ed. 1996). 
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tradition.  Additionally, the Court in Olsen accepted that, for purposes of its decision, the 
Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church was a bona fide religion.48 
It may be argued that defending the freedom of older religions while denying such 
rights to relatively younger religions would effectively be a violation of equal protection.  
Therefore, it would be necessary for the court to decide not only how heavily to weigh 
this factor, but also whether a religion has a valid enough argument that its belief 
structure can be categorized as a new religious sect rather than a frivolous cult.  The fear 
of permitting relatively younger religions the same autonomy as more established faiths 
is that there may be no evidence that the younger religion would thrive, or that it actually 
has an assembly of members who adhere to an identical set of beliefs.  By having a sort 
of “religious tenure,” the Government would be able to test the organization to see if it 
can maintain a strong member foundation before granting it such freedoms.  Thus, a bona 
fide church should be capable of surviving long enough to establish that its members 
deserve such equivalent rights. 
 The second prong may prove to be a strong factor in resolving the discrepancies 
between the religious organizations which are currently be permitted sacramental 
intoxicant use and those which are denied such rights.  The UDV maintains a hierarchical 
ranking system for members and leaders of the church.  In addition, members are 
required to learn Portuguese, as it is the language used during ceremonial services, 
similar to the way Latin is used in the Catholic Church and Hebrew in a Jewish 
Synagogue.49 Members have a certain day and time in which the sacramental use of 
 
48 878 F.2d at 1466. 
49 Declaration of Plaintiff at 53, Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, et al., 126 
S.Ct 1211(2006) (No. 04-1084). 
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ayahuasca occurs, as well as celebrations for enumerated calendar holidays. 50  This 
differs from the lack of uniformity and structure by the Rastafarians.  The court in 
McBride noted that although members proscribed to the same faith, the practices of the 
faith itself were only a loose network of postulates, actions being up to the discretion of 
the individual.51 Additionally, there is no specific day or time in which the sacramental 
drug was used.  In State v. Olsen, 52  the petitioner argued that “ganja” was used 
“continually all day, through everything we do.”53 In view of this argument, a court must 
either assume that everything the religion does all day is sacramental, or that the drug use 
is not in fact sacred to the faith.  If the court determines the latter, then it follows that the 
faith is not in fact a religion for purposes of this test. 
 Although it may be argued again that favoring formalized churches over 
unstructured, informal churches would pose an equal protection problem, the court would 
be able to address this concern by taking into consideration whether the informal 
organizations maintain a cohesive enough ideological structure to regard the group as a 
church as opposed to an assortment of disjointed beliefs.  The Government would likely 
want to avoid granting freedoms to such unorganized religions for fear that some 
individuals would join the faith solely for the purpose of obtaining illegal substances as 
opposed to a sincere desire to practice religious dogma.  Thus, in requiring a formal 
structure, the church would be able to regulate its own members by requiring them to 
participate in all religious activities, and not leave it up to the individual to cherry-pick. 
 
50 Id. at 58. 
51 71 F.Supp 2d at 1100. 
52 31 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1982) (Larson, J.J.). 
53 Id. at 7. 
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Lastly, the burden must be upon the State to prove that permitting the 
organizations adherents to participate in religious activities, such as sacramental drug use, 
would hinder the State in exerting its authority.  This is where the current standing 
compelling interest would be analyzed; if prohibiting the organization to act as an 
independent Church contributes to the furtherance of a compelling government interest 
and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest, then 
the government has met its burden.54 A result of this analysis in favor of the government 
would effectively eliminate the religious organization, however if the previous two 
prongs have been satisfied, the government would need a significant compelling reason 
to show that the religion poses a substantial burden on a governmental interest.  In 
essence, the third factor would be used to supplement a courts decision made in light of 
the first two prongs.   
Peyote and ayahuasca are relatively uncommon drugs, and followers of their 
religious beliefs, although extensive in numbers, in relation to the rest of the United 
States population are few and far between.55 Marijuana, on the other hand, is a very 
common drug, but the government has no more standing to prohibit marijuana use by 
religious adherents solely based on the fact that it is more common than it has to prohibit 
the generally low incidences of peyote and ayahuasca use.  In other words, all three drugs 
are illegal, and all fall within the same category of Schedule I substances, but if two are 
permitted use by their religious group, it follows that the third should be as well.  The 
government would likely attempt to argue that permitting the use by the religious group 
 
54 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1(a). 
55 See supra note 25. 
18
would encourage more people to falsely become adherents, however such a hypothesis 
would be moot as it is difficult to prove what a person does and does not actually believe. 
 Essentially, as the current compelling governmental interest test has proven vague, 
it must be supplemented by a more practical and consistent test.  Governmental interests 
are constantly changing, depending politics and the necessities of a nation.  However 
permitting a religion to act free of a government’s decisions would be the most practical 
method of establishing a freedom of religion, as well as separating Church and State.  
The only requirement by the government would be for the organization to prove that it is 
in fact a true religion, and that its tenets are strictly adhered to. 
 
IV. Beliefs, Actions, and Civil Religion 
In Cantwell v. Connecticut,56 the Court differentiated between the two freedoms 
that derive from the establishment clause; a freedom to believe and a freedom to act.57 
The first, the Court considered absolute in nature, whereas the second was not.  The 
Court justified this by stating that conduct remains subject to regulation and protection of 
our society. 58  In Reynolds v. United States, 59  the state upheld a criminal statute 
proscribing polygamy, despite the fact that polygamy was a basic tenet of the defendant’s 
Mormon religion.  However unlike the cases above, the religious belief in Reynolds was 
not achieved through polygamy, instead polygamy followed the tenets of the religious 
belief.  Based upon the holding in Cantwell, it may be possible for a religion to be denied 
its right to belief by not being permitted their right to act, as beliefs often follow from 
 
56 310 U.S. 296 (1939) (Roberts, J.). 
57 Id. at 303. 
58 See also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
59 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (Waite, J.). 
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acts.  If the purpose of using the drug is to put the believer in a certain mental state, one 
which they would not be able to achieve but for the drug’s use, then the only way that 
user will be able to obtain his desired spiritual nirvana is through committing those 
actions which are themselves subject to this kind of regulation 
In Mirsky’s Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause,60 the author argues that 
the separation between church and state is actually less existent than we think, as the 
formation of a “civil religion” has transpired in formation of our national heroes, such as 
Washington and Lincoln, and holy days, such as the Fourth of July and Memorial Day.61 
The permissiveness and denial of drug use by our civil religion has thus trumped the laws 
of the less powerful non Judeo-Christian faiths.  Consider “under god” in the pledge, as 
well as “in god we trust.”  These slogans are controversial in that they fit with the whole 
societal schema by which the United States developed under, and thus society may be 
reluctant to remove such simple prayers from their everyday lives.62 However to enforce 
such acts, not beliefs, as referring to god in a pledge, and not allowing the use of illegal 
drugs, essentially concedes that the civil secular faith is to be taken seriously, whereas the 
small minority faith is not.  It has been said that “one religious denomination cannot be 
officially preferred over another,”63 yet this may not be true if the majority civil religion 
has formulated the laws by which the minority faiths are governed. 
It is certainly true that many people in the United States consider their religious 
beliefs to be more important and compulsory than obeying government enacted laws.  
Throughout history, there have existed cultures of individuals which have been 
 
60 95 Yale L.G. 1237 (1986). 
61 Mirsky, supra note 57 at 1251. 
62 See Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
63 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
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persecuted for their faiths who have preferred death in abiding by gods command, 
believing it to be more important than living and having sinned.64 Although it may seem 
that modern society no longer lives under the judgment of a god, rather the practicality of 
science,65 it would still be difficult for anyone, including a government, to convince a 
sincere religious adherent that his genuine religious beliefs are false, even in the face of 
public adversity.  The United States is home to many devout religious organizations 
which, by society’s standards, may seem a bit extreme and unreasonable, but are still 
permitted to believe and act as they choose without reprimand by the government.66 
Unfortunately, while some of these religious organizations are favored by the government 
because their belief structure falls in sync with the political standing of a dominant 
political party, other religious organizations suffer as political and social xenophobia 
makes their practices unaccepted by society. 
In addition, people are often born into their faiths, and are not given an 
opportunity to truly question their belief structure until they are old enough to see the 
world through more scrupulous eyes.  There continues to exist a minority of Americans 
who disagree with the tenets of the civil religion,67 and many break these tenets through 
illegal acts such as underage drinking, drunk driving, jay-walking, and cheating on one’s 
taxes.  Although these acts are certainly not condonable, they serve as indication that 
even the tenets of the majority civil faith are not fully believed nor adhered to by the 
 
64 See Jacob Rader Marcus, The Jew in the Medieval World: a Source Book: 315-1791 (1999). 
65 But see South Park, Episode 151, Go, God, Go! Part II (2006) (Satirical commentary on secular 
extremists who believe that by eliminating religion entirely, war and poverty would end, and the practical 
likelihood that even without religion, societies would still go to war over for simple socio-cultural 
differences). 
66 See Craig M. Kibler, Assembly Declines to Make Clerk More Accountable, 36, The Layman, A 
Publication of the Presbyterian Lay Committee, July 2003 at 9 (A Christian newspaper article referring to 
the Uniao Do Vegetal as spirit, plant and animal worshipers who encourage ritualistic vomiting) 
67 See David DeLeon, The American Anarchist: Reflections of Indigenous Radicalism, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 117 (1979) 
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people, and thus have no more right to be accepted than the belief-based actions of the 
minority religions. 
Yet one could always argue before the courts or petition legislatures to change 
laws, as law, like religion, is ever changing to accommodate what is accepted and desired 
by society into its own belief structure.68 Perhaps the government’s strongest argument 
in this situation is to say that its beliefs are based on a safe and prolonged livelihood of its 
people.  Perhaps the establishment clause was submitted by the founding fathers to 
prevent war and strife over religion within the nation’s bounds, and drug use, drunk 
driving, and jay-walking, although not necessarily analogous to war and strife, are 
similarly dangerous to the people’s livelihoods, and are thus not permissible.  
[O]ne man’s “bizarre cult” is another’s true path to salvation.”69 The Judeo-
Christian faiths have stories of when their own religion was once considered a cult, 
wrong, and illegal.  History speaks of times when people were killed for their individual 
beliefs in god.  Prior to Constantine, the Christians were fed to the lions.  Mennonites 
were pushed out of Europe for simple cultural differences in faiths.70 Many sought the 
United States for freedom from persecution because of their cultural differences.  Have 
we grown too full to allow new faiths in our borders, and too intolerant to accept their 
cultural practices?  Perhaps nowadays we aren’t seeking more workers to build our towns 
and harvest our crops, and thus have become less warm and welcoming to anyone or 
anything that does not fit within our social comfort zone. 
 
68 See supra note 42. 
69 New York Times, Feb. 16, 1977, at 25. 
70 See Harold S. Bender, Mennonite and Their Heritage (1964). 
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V. Religious Gerrymandering 
“Beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible to other in 
order to merit First Amendment Protection.”71 The Court’s goal is to look objectively 
into the merits of a case and be able to provide impartial justice for all individuals, 
regardless of whether that individual’s activities fall outside what a society constitutes as 
“normal.”  But it is the society that deems certain drugs to be evil and impermissible, 
regardless of whether or not the drug in question is justifiably a detriment to society, and 
to what degree it is more or less injurious than legal drugs.72 What our society regards as 
damaging is reflected in the laws, yet the same society permits the use of alcohol and 
tobacco but not peyote, mescaline or marijuana. 
 A society’s standards have been ruled by the Courts to be an unworkable 
justification for the prevention of a religious activity.  In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. 
City of Hialeah, 73 a religious Santeria group was prohibited by a Florida animal cruelty 
statute from performing animal sacrifices.  The Government argued that the statute 
punishes “whoever...unnecessarily...kills an animal,” 74  and that killings for religious 
reasons are always deemed unnecessary.  The Court determined that the government’s 
interests were not compelling, that “the Free Exercise Clause commits government itself 
 
71 Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
72 See Robert S. Gable, Comparison of Acute Lethal Toxicity of Commonly Abused Psychoactive 
Substances, Addiction, 99, June 2004 at 686 (Study testing the relative levels of toxicity of psychoactive 
substances, finding marijuana and DMT to be relatively non-lethal, Mescaline rarely lethal, and alcohol 
commonly lethal and most common co-intoxicant in cause of death).  See also H. Kalant et al., The Health 
Effects of Canabis, Toronto Center for Addiction and Mental Health, 1999.  See also J.C. Callaway et al., 
Pharmacokinetics of Hoasca Alkaloids in Healthy Volunteers, Journal of Ethnopharmacology, 65, 1999 at 
243. 
73 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (Kennedy, J.). 
74 Fla. Stat. § 828.12 (1987). 
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to religious tolerance,”75 and that it is the duty of the legislators to remember the duties 
and rights granted by the Constitution.   
 If this sort of religious gerrymandering prohibits a government from excluding 
one religious group based on its unusual activities, would it not necessarily be 
gerrymandering if it were to exclude a religious group from using a controlled substance 
solely because the controlled substance also has a widespread recreational use?  Suppose 
that the Florida statute was enacted to prevent people from deliberately harming house 
pets and having cock fights.  Similar anti-drug laws are enacted to prevent recreational 
use of drugs.  If the Court is able to strike down a statute in that it is was passed 
specifically to target the unusual activities of one religion, that of sacrificing animals for 
religious purposes, it should follow that certain law may be struck down in that it denies 
the use of controlled substances for religious purposes.  The Court has already created 
such exceptions for the two drugs that have less pervasive recreational use, but lacks a 
compelling analysis to reject requests for religious marijuana use. 
 When Councilman Martinez, a supporter of the animal cruelty statutes, stated that 
people were put in jail for practicing this religion in pre-revolution Cuba, the audience at 
a Hialeah City Council meeting applauded.76 Does this imply that we too should seek a 
nation where certain religious groups are seen as outsiders, and their actions are looked 
upon with a sense of racial intolerance?  In Nazi Germany, the government solicited 
advertisements depicting Jews and monsters and vampires, so when they were removed 
from the cities, the Germans too would applaud.77 The Court rejected the Councilman’s 
 
75 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 547. 
76 Id. at 541. 
77 See Randall L. Bytwerk, Bending Spines: The Propagandas of Nazi Germany and the German 
Democratic Republic (2004). 
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indications of the desires of the masses because it suggested a suppression of minority 
religion.  Adhering to the masses unknowledgeable rejection of sacramental drug use also 
suppresses religions like the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church, and thus the Court should 
consider the same dilemma when refusing the religion to act upon the tenets of its faith. 
 The ordinances permitted such killing as fishing, extermination of rats and mice, 
and euthanasia of stray, neglected, abandoned or unwanted animals.78 The determinative 
factors of which animals may and may not be killed according to the city seemed 
arbitrary, but the city carved out specific animals it would permit removal of.  The statute 
stated that an animal may be killed “for humanitarian reasons, or when the animal is of 
no commercial value,”79 or “the infliction of pain or suffering is in interest of medical 
science.”80 Had the ordinance been passed, the Court would have effectively been saying 
that commercial purposes and medical science outweigh the interests in pursuit of 
religion. 
 This degree of lack of trust and understanding about the practices of another 
religion is exactly the type of mindset the Court has attempted to remove from law.  A 
control should be placed over government from inhibiting religious practice solely 
because a practice does not fit within the confines of what society dictates is normal.  
Where a group of people are permitted to have their own ethnocentric beliefs as to what 
is and is not fitting and correct, those personal beliefs of the individual and the mass 
should never be allowed to breach another individual’s conviction in the value of his or 
her religion. 
 
78 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543. 
79 Fla. Stat. § 828.073(4)(c)(2). 
80 Fla. Stat. § 828.02. 
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VI. The Lesser of Evils 
The District court noted in Uniao that the Courts must balance the actual 
irreparable harm to the plaintiff and the potential harm to the government.81 Excluding 
the irreconcilable Rubix Cube that can be a Court’s justification of a judicial decision, the 
actual practical difference between Uniao and Olsen was the risk associated with 
diversion.  In Uniao, the plaintiff took careful steps to avoid the drug getting into the 
wrong hands.  The UDV set up strict rules as to who was allowed to use the ayahuasca 
and when it could be consumed.82 Members who violated these rules were subject to 
expulsion from the organization.  The UDV also indicated to the court that they 
maintained strict policies against other narcotics use.  The plaintiff claimed that he only 
imported quantities of the plant necessary to fulfill to enact the church ceremonies.83 
The plaintiff in Olsen, on the other hand, was caught with large quantities of 
marijuana prepared for distribution.84 The Court is likely aware of the relative ease of 
obtaining marijuana in the United States as opposed to less common drugs such as peyote 
and ayahuasca.85 Perhaps the Court should have been aware that due to the pervasive use 
of marijuana, member of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church were likely going to acquire 
marijuana regardless of their Court’s decision.  This kind of oversight creates a problem 
in that it makes preventing marijuana overuse practically unenforceable.  Preventing a 
religion from obtaining its sacramental drug, while have knowledge that members will 
 
81 Uniao, 126 S.Ct at 1219. 
82 Declaration of Plaintiff at 63, Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, et al., 126 
S.Ct 1211(2006) (No. 04-1084). 
83 Id. at 66. 
84 State v. Olsen, 315 N.W.2d 1 (1982). 
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continue to do so anyway, essentially encourages the performance of illegal acts.  A court 
must realize that the law will only be as constructive as it is obeyed.  
 Additionally, it should follow that the more dangerous a drug, the more it should 
be restricted.  Studies have shown that marijuana use is considerably less dangerous than 
DMT, 86  and yet DMT is permitted limited used to a special class of individuals.  
Marijuana, although a Schedule I drug, has in fact had a history of accepted medical use 
in the United States.87 Further, if the Court were to mitigate with the Ethiopian Zion 
Coptic Church and permit it regulated marijuana use,88 perhaps it would decrease the 
likelihood of Church members from engaging in illegal acts, or limit their use of 
marijuana to sacramental activities.  Rather the Court rejects the Church’s requests, and 
permits the use of peyote, whose users spend an average of eight hours incapacitated.89 If 
the Court were to base it determination of which religions are permitted to use the illegal 
drug and which are not on the relative dangerousness of the drug, they would be hard 
pressed to justify the use of peyote or ayahuasca over marijuana. 
 
Conclusion 
If the Court were required to take an all or nothing approach in permitting 
religious drug use rather than continue to employ its current method of cherry-picking 
which organizations may obtain such an exclusion, it would be forced to extend equal 
rights to all organizations whom request individual religious benefits, lest the government 
 
86 See supra note 69. 
87 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) 
88 The Court appointed amicus curiae proposed a limited “restrictive religious exemption” for the Ethiopian 
Zion Coptic Church.  Church members over the age of majority would be permitted to use marijuana 
during their Saturday evening prayer, and would not be allowed to leave the place where the ceremony was 
conducted until eight hours had passed.  The DEA denied this exemption.  Olsen, 878 F.2d at 1460. 
89 John H. Halpern, et al., Psychological and Cognitive Effects of Long-Term Peyote Use Among Native 
Americans, 58, Biological Psychiatry, Oct. 15, 2005 at 624 
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is capable of discerning a legitimate compelling reason to eliminate that freedom from all 
religions.   
Considering the implausibility of such a carte blanche approach, it would be 
beneficial for the government to establish a precise test by which all petitioning religions 
could be adjudicated by.  The Court should first look into the history and tradition of the 
religion to determine its legitimacy as a sincere and comprehensive faith.  Second, the 
Court should explore the commonalities between adherents of the faith, and question to 
what degree its members adhere to similar tenets with one another.  Lastly, the Court 
should balance the burden that permitting such freedoms would have on the State, and 
decide whether granting those freedoms serve a more just function than those of the 
specific goals of the government.  If the Court does not adopt a standard method of 
weighing the freedoms of religious organizations adequately, it will be forced to continue 
using an ad hoc inquiry to designate such freedoms. 
The Court in Uniao understood that the freedom to religious practice is essential 
to furthering the goals set by the Constitution.  By encumbering the freedom for religious 
groups to act in accordance with their faith, the Court would effectively be stripping a 
part of that freedom from its citizens.  If the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church were to come 
before the Supreme Court and argue the merits of their case, the Court would be hard 
pressed after Uniao to come up with justification for denying a legal exemption.  
Unfortunately, the likelihood of such a case coming before the Supreme Court is slim.  
Perhaps other motives have pressed the Court to hear Uniao and extend the UDV such a 
controversial freedom, however the prospect of legalizing marijuana use is certainly a fire 
the Court doesn’t want to play with. 
